“PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS IN AN AFRICAN TRADITION”: A CRITIQUE OF MOTSAMAI MOLEFE

Authors

  • Ademola Kazeem FAYEMI (PhD)

Keywords:

Personhood, Afro-Communitarianism, Rights, Motsamai Molefe, Kwame Gyekye

Abstract

African philosophical discourse on the relationship between personhood and human rights is roughly a recent preoccupation. In his seminal essay, “Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition”, Motsamai Molefe revisited the debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye on the nature of Afro-communitarianism and its theoretical implication on personhood and rights. While advancing Menkiti’s normative conception of personhood that gives primacy to duties over rights, Molefe argues that Gyekye’s Afro-communitarian construction of personhood that grounds rights as primary over duties is fundamentally problematic. In this paper, I seek to critically defend Gyekye against the three-pronged criticisms levelled against his perspective by Molefe. In interrogating Molefe’s arguments, I argue that none of the arguments is strong enough to vitiate the strength of Gyekye’s robust analysis of personhood and rights in African political philosophy. Drawing insights from the works of Gyekye, I contend that his views provide an intersectional (non-conflicting) relation between Afro-communal moral duties of personhood and human rights. In conclusion, I identify some other critical problems in Gyekye’s analysis of personhood and human rights that can further stimulate conversation in future African philosophical studies.

Published

2024-07-30